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1.1.The classical theory of economic policy (Tinbergen): control of a parametric 
system  
The theory of economic policy is the area of economic theory that focuses on the 
investigation of a policy problem “resulting from the interaction of a policy 
objective, representing some abstract policymaker’s desires, with a policy model, 
representing the feasible outcomes of policy actions” (Preston and Pagan, 1982: 
                                                 
1 This is a modified version of Chapter 1 of N. Acocella, G. Di Bartolomeo and A. Hughes Hallett, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012. 
 ix) 
The theory of economic policy has its roots in Tinbergen’s econometric models of 
the Dutch and the US economy (Tinbergen, 1936, 1939) and was developed by 
Tinbergen himself when serving as the first director of the Dutch Central Planning 
Bureau, 1945 on (Hughes Hallett, 1989) 
In the early 1950s, in addressing in formal terms the issue of the controllability of 
a fixed set of independent targets by a policymaker facing a parametric context 
(i.e. facing an economy represented by a system of linear equations) and endowed 
with given instruments, he was able to state some well-known general conditions 
for policy existence (see Tinbergen, 1952, 1956), in terms of number of 
instruments and targets. In particular, Tinbergen’s classical golden rule asserts 
that a policymaker can reach his (fixed) targets if the number of his independent 
instruments equals the number of his independent targets. A similar approach was 
developed by Bent Hansen in the same years (Hansen, 1958).2 
Tinbergen’s theory deserves the merit of having raised the problem of conditions 
for the existence of a first-best policy, i.e. a vector of instruments ensuring the 
solution to the policy problem when addressed in its simplest way of fixed targets. 
Among the many issues left unsolved by Tinbergen’s theory, Theil cited four main 
difficulties: uncertainty as to data; model uncertainty; uncertainty as to the 
variables controlled by other decision-makers; choice of target values. In his works 
Theil gave a solution for most of these difficulties and for others as well. In 
particular, by prescribing that the policymaker should maximize a preference 
function (or minimize a loss function) subject to constraints describing the 
                                                 
2 As Petit (1990: 5) reminds us, the Swedish edition of Hansen’s book is dated 1955. 
functioning of the economy, he accomplished a number of tasks: he avoided the 
sub-optimality of an a priori choice of target values; he also avoided the difficulties 
facing the policymaker when endowed with a number of instruments lower than 
the number of targets; finally, he gave a certain and positive answer to the issue of 
the existence of a solution for the policy problem also in non-Tinbergen systems 
(Theil, 1954, 1956, 1964).3  
In so doing Theil arrived at a solution of the policy problem formally very similar to 
that predicated by Ragnar Frisch (Frisch, 1949, 1950, 1957, 1961), who had first 
conceived policy problems in terms of maximizing a social preference function, 
derived by interviewing policymakers.  
Theil also overcame the rigid distinction between targets and instruments, 
allowing the latter to be relevant per se and directly introducing them into the 
objective function,4 and developed the theory of economic policy in a dynamic 
setting.5  
Development of the modern methods of control theory6 complemented this 
strand of literature to give an apparently very powerful set of instruments for 
                                                 
3 These are systems where the number of independent instruments is lower than that of 
independent targets. 
4 This, however, may be necessary partly because of a misspecification of the objective function 
(Petit, 1990: 148). 
5 Hansen (1958) also developed a dynamic approach to the policy problem. Further improvements 
and advancements of the classical theory as to the existence, uniqueness and design of economic 
policies are due to a number of authors and accounted for in Leontief (1964, 1976), Heal (1973), 
Preston (1974), Johansen (1977, 1978), Preston and Pagan (1982), Hughes Hallett and Rees (1983) 
and Petit (1990). 
6 See Bellman (1957, 1961), Kalman (1960), Pontryagin et al. (1962), Athans and Falb (1966), 
Pyndick (1973), Aoki (1976).   
 designing and implementing policy issues.7 
Tinbergen, Theil, and the other founding fathers of economic policy were only 
partly concerned with analyzing the effectiveness of specific policy instruments, 
which has been raised by the subsequent economic literature with reference to 
specific instruments, monetary policy, fiscal policy or others.8  
As said, the focus of the theory was on the general conditions for controllability of 
an economic system. Existence of at least as many instruments as targets is the 
simple necessary condition. The necessary and sufficient condition is that those 
instruments must also be linearly independent.9 These are rather simple 
conditions to verify and if they are met, the policymaker has no obstacle in 
pursuing his objectives, in a system that does not react to his policies. 
 
1.2. Rational expectations and Lucas’ critique: loss of control? 
The classical theory of economic policy has been the object of fierce criticism from 
a number of points of view. The introduction of rational expectations led to an 
assertion of the ineffectiveness of monetary policy that was more forceful than 
that famously stated by Milton Friedman (see Friedman, 1968) in his 1968 
American Economic Association Presidential Address (Sargent and Wallace, 1975). 
In a similar way, with rational expectations fiscal policy was considered to be 
ineffective on income (Barro, 1974). A proposition of policy neutrality or 
                                                 
7 These methods proved to be particularly useful in a dynamic setting for finding a unique control 
path or when the system is not point-controllable, as they enable us to get a second best solution. 
On differences and equivalences between the Theil-type controllability method and optimal 
control theory see Hughes Hallett (1989) and Petit (1990). 
8 Hansen (1958) is an exception, as he deals extensively with fiscal policy. 
9 The reason for this more general condition is obvious: the instruments may be sufficient in 
number but unable to generate separate effects. 
“invariance” was then stated with regard to two main short run policy 
instruments.  
Apart from the critiques advanced with reference to the effectiveness of specific 
instruments, the more general and forceful argument was raised by Lucas (1976) 
according to which the conclusions of a Tinbergen-type decision model are 
inconsistent with the assumption of rational expectations (REs). The importance of 
this contribution lied in the fact that it denied the validity of the solution given by 
Tinbergen, Theil and others to the existence of an (optimal) policy vector (or a 
sequence of vectors) that can achieve policy targets (or get close to them), 
assuming the private sector behavior to be invariant to the vector itself. In other 
terms, when the private sector has rational expectations the policymaker loses 
control of the economic system, as they imply inexistence of the parametric 
system facing him according to the classical theory of economic policy.  
This implication is apparently easy to understand if one realizes that assuming REs 
amounts to implicitly changing the nature of the economic system confronted by 
the policymaker: the private sector has objectives conflicting with those of the 
policymaker and can somewhat react to his action. The policymaker then faces a 
system that is no longer parametric and this leads, per se, according to Lucas, to a 
loss of control. However, this implication might not survive an explicit statement 
of the underlying conflict between the policymaker and the private sector. Put 
differently, this critique might be true of the Tinbergen theory of economic policy. 
But that is not to say it is also true of a revised or new theory of economic policy, 
possibly exploiting both Tinbergen and Theil contributions. It all depends on 
whether the private sector reactions can be accommodated in the policy maker’s 
decisions; or whether the private sector’s reactions are strong enough to exactly 
 offset, in their own self-interest, what the policymaker is trying to do. In general, 
private agents can neither offset those actions completely – nor would they try to 
do so, as we shall show. 
 
1.3. Policy games and explicit conflicts: results of policy neutrality, but no (general) 
theory of neutrality  
In the 1980s, pioneered by Barro and Gordon (1983), a new approach to the 
analysis of economic policy was developed, that of policy games, exempt from the 
Lucas critique. As said above, introducing REs amounts to implicitly assuming some 
kind of reaction of the system to the policy enacted, as a consequence of 
conflicting objectives. This implicit assumption and the underlying conflict 
between the policymaker and the private sector can be made explicit if the issue 
facing the policymaker is built in a context (that of games) where the private 
sector’s behavior is explicitly modelled from its preferences. Strategic interaction 
between the private sector and the policymaker ensures that REs are satisfied.  
With Barro and Gordon (1983) the emphasis of the policy debate was still far from 
the search for conditions of existence of an instrument vector that could 
guarantee satisfaction of some fixed targets (Tinbergen’s fixed-target approach) or 
an optimal policy that maximizes a given preference function (Theil’s flexible-
target approach). In fact the Lucas’ critique was practically deemed to be 
destructive of the possibility that the policymaker could control the system. The 
discussion concentrated instead on issues of the effectiveness (or neutrality) of 
specific instruments when the private sector has some specific target and 
instrument, continuing in the new setting the debate started in the previous two 
decades. 
Barro and Gordon (1983) studied a (Stackelberg) game between the central bank 
and the private sector, where the latter is the leader and trades off real wage and 
employment when setting the nominal wage rate. They then delivered again the 
well-known assertion of monetary neutrality as a result of the private sector 
expectations of discretionary monetary policy: the private sector forms rational 
expectations and fully crowds-out monetary effects on real output.10 A superior 
solution for the public sector is to commit to a rule. The policymaker would always 
be tempted to cheat and renege on his commitment, because of time 
inconsistency  (see Kydland and Prescott’s (1977), in an attempt to pursue a 
superior outcome. But awareness on the side of the private sector of this 
possibility would generate worse results that could be avoided only if the 
temptation to cheat is balanced by the fear of the policymaker to lose his 
reputation, if the interaction (game) with the private sector is repeated.  
With Barro and Gordon (1983) we certainly have a result of policy neutrality, but 
this result is  specific to the assumptions of the model. We don’t have a theory of 
policy neutrality. A part of the following literature tried to elaborate such a theory 
in different ways, making no reference to Tinbergen’s contribution.  
In an influential article, Rogoff (1985) showed that uncertainty can break the 
neutrality mechanism, in terms of second moments by creating a trade-off 
between the variances of inflation and output (or employment). In an influential 
article, Rogoff (1985a) showed that uncertainty can break the neutrality 
mechanism, in terms of second moments, by creating a trade-off between the 
variances of inflation and output (or employment). Sargent (1999) also explored 
                                                 
10 See, also Stokey (1989, 1991). 
 the short run trade-off between inflation and unemployment by focusing on 
uncertainty, specifically on imperfect knowledge and misperceptions by 
policymakers and/or private agents in a policy game with learning. He showed 
that the rise and fall of U.S. inflation can be attributed to policy makers’ changing 
beliefs about the natural rate hypothesis. In other words, he put forward a 
hypothesis that American inflation dynamics can be explained by the Federal 
Reserve discovering and subsequently abandoning the Phillips curve. In a similar 
manner, Orphanides and Williams (2002) attributed the volatility and failure of US 
anti-inflation policies in the 1970s to the Federal Reserve’s misunderstanding of 
the natural rate of output, and hence output gap, on the basis of real time data. 
Real time data is, of course, the only data available to the policymakers when they 
have to make their decisions. So these volatility trade-offs will always be present; 
there is no point in supposing the policymakers used the ex-post data they could 
not have had at the time.  
By introducing nominal rigidities, the New Keynesian School has developed a more 
refined version of Rogoff’s model, where uncertainty derives from the forward 
looking behavior of the private sector.11 It is worth noticing that, in an influential 
article, Clarida et al. (1999) explicitly mentioned the Tinbergen-Theil approach in 
illustrating their solution: “This formulation is in many ways in the tradition of the 
classic Jan Tinbergen (1952)/Henri Theil (1961) (TT) targets and instruments 
problem. As with TT, the combination of quadratic loss and linear constraints 
yields a certainty equivalent decision rule for the path of the instrument. The 
                                                 
11 The New Keynesian approach is well illustrated by Woodford (2003) and Galì (2008). 
optimal feedback rule, in general, relates the instrument to the state of the 
economy.”12 
Another interesting line of investigation has followed the idea that neutrality 
depends on the content of the preferences of the private sector: simple addition 
to the private sector’s preferences of other targets explicitly shared with the 
policymaker would have avoided the neutrality result. Gylfason and Lindbeck 
(1994) suggested that monetary policy non-neutrality arises whenever the private 
sector (labour unions) explicitly shares the objective of price stability with the 
central bank in addition to that of the real wage (or employment). Acocella and 
Ciccarone (1997) generalized the above result by taking into consideration also 
public debt. Jerger (2002) demonstrated also in a different setting that the 
traditional paradigm of neutrality does not hold if wage setters are inflation 
averse.  
However, this rule for finding a neutrality result seemed to lose ground when non-
competitive markets were introduced into the picture: Guzzo and Velasco (1999), 
Soskice and Iversen (2000), Cukierman and Lippi (2001), Lippi (2003), Coricelli et 
al. (2006) and other studies13 showed in fact that non-neutrality of monetary 
policy can derive from the interaction between imperfectly competitive goods and 
labour markets even when unions do not explicitly share a common objective with 
the monetary authorities. Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004) admitted that also 
implicit addition of shared targets would have the effect of violating the neutrality 
result: in fact, they suggested that non-neutrality only emerges when unions share 
                                                 
12 However, as they remark, in New Keynesian models “target variables depend not only on the 
current policy but also on expectations about future policy” (Clarida et al., 1999). 
13 See Cukierman (2004) for a survey. 
 some targets with the monetary authorities either explicitly or implicitly. Only in 
their conclusions they hinted at a possible explanation in terms of number of 
instruments and targets of the various players. 
 
1.4. The new theory of economic policy: the classical theory (control) in the new 
context (policy games and conflicts) 
An advance in the explanation of the neutrality result (and in the theory of 
economic policy) needed further steps to be taken. This was achieved on realizing 
that those conditions for policy invariance or, instead, policy effectiveness that 
were stated by Barro and Gordon (1983) and the articles presenting other policy 
games reviewed in the previous section hold only under specific circumstances. 
The general conditions leading to effectiveness or neutrality of the policy of a 
player might have to do with existence of conflicts on shared targets with other 
players and the possibility that the player in question has or does not have enough 
instruments for reaching his targets. This consideration led to rediscovering the 
requirements for controllability of an economic system asserted by the classical 
theory of economic policy (Acocella and Di Bartolomeo, 2005, 2006).  
For the purposes of illustration, let us refer to a situation in which different players 
have at least one overlapping target, but they conflict on the precise preferred 
value of that (or those) target(s), i.e. in their target value(s). Assume that one 
player, e.g. player 1, controls the economic system, since it has a number of 
linearly independent instruments at least equal to that of his targets. It is then 
intuitive to guess (and show) that another player can hardly have an influence on 
that (those) target(s) if his target value(s) for the common target(s) are different 
(and it has no enough instruments to control the economic system). In this 
situation the conflict can be only solved to the benefit of the controlling player 
and the other player’s policies are neutral (ineffective, or invariant) with respect 
to the shared objective(s). This is the first fundamental proposition of the new 
theory of economic policy. 
Proceeding in this way amounted to using the old, i.e. the classical, theory of 
economic policy in a new setting, that of policy games, which, by assumption, 
represents a situation of conflicts among different agents. Since the classical 
theory was a theory of controllability, i.e. of the possibility for one agent, the 
policymaker, to pursue his objectives, when applied to a situation of conflicts it 
gave the possibility to specify the conditions under which the conflict could (or 
could not) be solved to his benefit. From this point of view, the old theory could 
aim at the role of being a theory of conflict resolutions.  
In fact it has been able to explain all the cases of neutrality (or non neutrality) that 
had been investigated in the literature, from Barro and Gordon (1983) on, in very 
simple terms, and, as we will see better below, without solving the underlying 
games (Acocella and Di Bartolomeo, 2005; Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Hughes 
Hallett, 2006). 
 
1.5. Applications of the new theory to model building: not only a theory of 
neutrality, but also of game equilibrium existence, uniqueness and multiplicity  
This role of a theory of conflict resolutions was strengthened when it was realized 
that more than one player could control the. The neutrality result gave an 
indication of the player in favour of which the conflict could be resolved, i.e. the 
player controlling the system. When however there is a conflict between two or 
more players each of which can control it, there is a kind of stalemate and no 
 possibility of solving the conflict along the rules of a simple strategic game arises.  
In fact, let us assume that at least two players share at least one target and that 
the golden rule applies for both. Since each player has at least the same number 
of instruments as targets, both should reach their objectives. However, if they 
have conflicting target values, the possibility to further their objectives cannot 
materialize, as the system cannot admit two different values for the same variable 
at the same time. The consequence is that existence of the equilibrium of the 
game requires that two or more players do not satisfy the golden rule. In case of 
no conflict, i.e. if the players share not only the same target(s), but also the same 
target value(s), existence of an equilibrium is possible in so far as the objective(s) 
is (are) concerned, but a problem would arise in terms of instruments. In fact, 
even in the absence of a conflict, indeterminacy would result as to how to reach 
the agreed target value(s) and there may be infinite combinations of the 
instruments of the different players capable of furthering those values. A 
coordination failure would then arise in this case of no conflict.  
Thus, in addition to the result of neutrality (or non neutrality), applying the 
classical theory of economic policy to policy games can lead to stating the 
conditions for equilibrium existence (or inexistence) as well as equilibrium 
uniqueness or multiplicity. These results represent the second fundamental 
proposition of the new theory of economic policy.  
All the results concerning the properties of the policy game (i.e. those stated in 
the two fundamental propositions of the new theory) can be derived in terms of 
simple rules about the relative number of (linearly independent) instruments and 
(linearly independent) targets for each player, without solving the game. 
They then appear to be particularly relevant from a methodological point of view. 
To design a viable model, we need a check of mutual consistency between the 
optimal decisions of the agents. In other terms, we need the interaction between 
the players to guarantee a solution, i.e. equilibrium existence in terms of both 
outcomes (targets) and strategies (policies). In any game with all kinds of players 
(all public, all private or both public and private) with overlapping targets, 
existence of an equilibrium of the whole system must exclude controllability of the 
same targets by more than one player. In addition, if we want to ensure a 
particularly important feature of the policy game we are going to build, in the 
form of some action taken by a player (in particular that player to which – in a 
narrow definition of economic policy – we want to attribute the quality of a 
policymaker) to be effective, we need that player only (and no other player) to 
satisfy the golden rule of economy policy.  
 
1.6. Applications to institution building: centralization and decentralization, 
hegemony, warfare, implicit coalitions 
A change of perspective in looking at the issue of controllability has led to 
important applications of the new theory of economic policy to institution 
building.  
The perspective used in the initial formulation of the new theory was that of 
controllability by the single players: if only one player controls, the policies of the 
other(s) are neutral; if more than one player controls, no equilibrium exists in 
terms of either outcomes or strategies.  
However, one can look at a game from the perspective of groups of players or of 
the system as a whole. From the former point of view a generalization of the first 
 propositions of the new theory of economic policy has concerned the passage 
from a situation of conflict among all players to one with no conflict among some 
players and a conflict persistent among groups of players. A group of players 
sharing only some target values, while having other not overlapping targets can 
play in a symbiotic way as a unique player if those players have a total number of 
instruments equal to their targets. If this is the case, they implement a kind of 
(implicit) coordination and then act as an implicit coalition. All the results in terms 
of neutrality and equilibrium existence derived in terms of the golden rule with 
respect to single players can then be applied to implicit coalitions (Acocella, Di 
Bartolomeo and Piacquadio, 2009).   
One can also look at a game from the latter point of view, i.e. from the perspective 
of the system as a whole, taking account of the total number of independent 
targets expressed by the various players and the total number of their 
independent instruments. From this perspective, it has been shown that in a linear 
quadratic policy game with overlapping preferences the necessary condition for 
the existence of the Nash equilibrium is that the total number of instruments 
available for all the players should not exceed the total number of targets of all 
the players (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Hughes Hallett, 2011b).  
This implies the existence of a fundamental asymmetry in institutional solutions: if 
an economic system is over-determined (i.e., the number of instruments is higher 
than that of targets), it can be solved by some ‘social planner’ by taking the 
exceeding number of instruments over targets as given, whereas a decentralized 
solution fails to exist. The possible advantages of centralization deriving from the 
abundance of instruments are lost in a decentralized solution and indeterminacy 
arises from decentralization, raising a problem of coordination. 
This proposition has many practical applications in particular in international 
economics. The n-th country problem (Mundell, 1968) is indeed a specific case in 
point: no equilibrium exists among n countries pursuing independent results in 
their balances of payments, if all of them make use of an independent instrument, 
as there can be only n-1 independent external balances. The practical solution to 
non-existence of an equilibrium can then be voluntary giving up of the use of its 
instrument by some country. As an alternative a situation of economic warfare, 
possibly leading to other, more cruel, forms of warfare, can ensue.  
Even in the case where the contrast among countries is at the minimum level or 
there is no conflict at all, which happens when their target values coincide, as, 
e.g., when all of them are interested to stabilize the international monetary 
system, the need arises of either an international institution that coordinate the 
countries’ policies or a hegemon à la Kindleberger (see Kindleberger, 1973) that 
acts as an anchor to stabilize countries’ expectations.  
Another institutional implication of the new theory that deserves a mention at this 
point derives from an extension of the Tinbergen-Theil analysis to dynamic 
problems in a context where a policymaker interacts with the private sector and 
REs hold. In fact REs, rather than implying ineffectiveness of policies, will typically 
help the policymaker to pursue his targets if he makes proper announcements, 
when some conditions involving possession of enough instruments are satisfied. If 
this is the case, the policy problem is no longer finding institutions guaranteeing a 
credible commitment, but of how the policy changes should be announced 
(Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Hughes Hallett, 2011a). 
 
1.7. Generalizations and extensions  
 The two fundamental propositions of policy ineffectiveness and existence of 
equilibrium refer to Nash policy games as well as any hierarchical equilibrium and 
are limited to the common case of quadratic preferences and linear constraints. 
This, however, should not be considered as a heavy limitation of the theory, since 
many non-linear models are really approximated in terms of linear models, in 
order to derive closed-form solutions. 
By contrast, the propositions can be easily extended to other richer information 
structures or model frameworks, without affecting the basic underlying intuition. 
For instance, if we consider linear-quadratic preferences14 under linear 
constraints, the results are only slightly different. By redefining the golden rule in 
terms of quadratic target variables (i.e. a policymaker satisfies the golden rule if 
the number of his independent instruments equals the number of his independent 
quadratic targets), both propositions still hold for simultaneous (Nash) games.  
A further generalization has been derived with reference to instruments costs. The 
classical theory of economic policy admitted the possibility of attributing the 
instrumental variables a value in their own, for various reasons, such as existence 
of psychological or material costs tied to their use. This extension can obviously 
hold also for the new theory of economic policy. However, one must be cautious 
in implementing this more general way of expressing the policymaker’s 
preferences, as the properties of a policy game would be altered accordingly. In 
fact, the total number of objectives would be increased by the presence in the 
preference function not only of the true targets, but also of instruments, implying 
that the policymaker (or any other player) never controls the economic system, 
                                                 
14 By linear quadratic preferences we mean that some (target) variables are second order entries in 
the player’s preference function and others enter it only linearly, i.e. are first order entries. 
with understandable implications in terms of neutrality and equilibrium existence. 
Then, inclusion of instrument costs into the loss function should be limited to the 
cases where the player incurs true losses in gearing his instruments. 
 
1.8. Dynamics: rational expectations, announcements and credibility, time-
inconsistency 
The results presented above are not confined to statics. They also hold in a 
dynamic setting, where the propositions on neutrality and equilibrium existence 
based on the concept of controllability retain their value (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo 
and Hughes Hallett, 2007). Such results would not be satisfactory, however, in a 
dynamic context until REs are added to the setting. 
Dynamics with REs is in fact the critical context for the new theory of economic 
policy. REs, which were the decisive argument employed to critique the classical 
theory, pertain to dynamics, which is then the proper field for a decisive test for 
the validity of the neutrality propositions asserted by the new theory.  
In this context, it has been shown (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Hughes Hallett, 
2011a) that policy targets can be controlled, and expectations managed through 
the policy process, as long as the anticipated and feedback effects of a policy 
change balance in such a way that there is no policy impact on current outcomes, 
and as long as the policymaker has enough instruments available for reaching his 
targets. If the two effects cancel out and the policymaker has no sufficient 
instruments, the conflict with the private sector cannot be resolved in his interest 
and policy neutrality holds. But, if this is not the case, REs have no impact on the 
effectiveness of public policy. Hence REs do not, in themselves, prevent 
controllability. On the contrary, they can typically enhance the effectiveness of 
 economic policy: in fact, even in the case where the number of instruments is less 
that of targets, controllability would be ensured with REs if the policymaker is 
patient and makes proper (credible) announcements of his future policies.  
The implications of this result are important in terms, again, of model and 
institution building. All dynamic problems that imply the achievement of a given 
target at a certain moment of time –such as fiscal consolidation, or achieving 
macroeconomic targets in order to enter a currency union –will find an important 
ally in the existence of REs if a proper number of instruments is available to the 
policymaker. The policy problem would no longer be a general matter of how to 
find a credible commitment, but of how the policy changes should be announced 
given the economy’s lag structure, if there are no conflicts between public and 
private information sets. Hence time inconsistency and the need for a 
commitment technology may appear in certain cases; but they are far from 
representing the typical outcome and a necessary requirement. 
 
1.9. Conclusions 
The importance of the new theory of economic policy can therefore be 
summarized in four points.  
First, its two fundamental propositions (on policy neutrality and equilibrium 
existence) appear to be essential for model building, as they state the conditions 
under which the effectiveness of policy instruments, as well as consistency of the 
optimal strategies of all the players (and thus the existence of the equilibrium of 
the game), are guaranteed.  
Second, the theory has important applications for devising proper institutions.  
Third, rational expectations are not necessarily an obstacle to policy effectiveness. 
On the contrary, they can enhance it and make debates on time inconsistency and 
the need for commitment irrelevant when the policymaker and the private sector 
share the same information on the working of the economic system. That again 
carries important implications for the design of institutions and how they work.  
Finally, from the perspective of the history of economic thought, it may be 
important that the theory of economic policy, in going back to the tools devised by 
Tinbergen and Theil and applying them to a context of policy games, has become a 
theory of conflict resolution, precisely because it states the properties of the game 
both in terms of whose instruments are effective and in terms of the conditions 
for the existence, uniqueness and multiplicity of solutions of policy games.  
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